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Article
On New ‘Judicial Animals’: The Curious
Case of an African Court with Material
Jurisdiction of a Global Scope
Adamantia Rachovitsa*
ABSTRACT
The article aims to think anew about the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court, based in Arusha, enjoys a distinctive
contentious jurisdiction which extends to the interpretation and application of any other
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. The Court’s striking
features set it apart from human rights bodies and most international courts. Its juris-
diction has been received with scepticism and fear arguing that, if the Court extends its
jurisdiction over treaties other than the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
this will lead to jurisprudential chaos and will undermine the formation of the African
corpus juris. This article discusses the case law of the Court since 2013, when the Court
started functioning, and argues that these concerns are over-emphasized. The analysis
underlines the shifting authority of specialized and/or regional courts; the need not to
overstress but to appreciate positively instances of divergence; and the consideration of
new conceptual and geographical topoi, in which international law is to be found and
produced.
KEYWORDS: human rights, judicial dispute settlement, jurisdiction ratione materiae,
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article I discuss anew ideas about the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the Court’ or ACtHPR). The Court, based in
Arusha, enjoys a distinctive contentious jurisdiction. Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Protocol to the ACHPR’) reads:
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The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to
it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and
any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.1
Article 7 of the Protocol to the ACHPR (sources of law) reads in identical terms.2
The distinctiveness of the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction lies in the fact that its mandate
extends to the interpretation and application of any other relevant human rights instru-
ment ratified by the States concerned. In contrast, the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) is limited to matters concerning the interpretation and application of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)3 and the American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR),4 respectively. Equally narrow is the competence of the
United Nations (UN) human rights bodies each of which has been entrusted with
monitoring a given treaty. Consequently, the ACtHPR deviates from the ‘prototype’
of the jurisdiction of a human rights court/body. Its striking features set it apart also
from most international courts,5 arguably qualifying it as a new ‘judicial animal’ that
introduces a variance in ‘judicial genome mapping’.6
The ACtHPR’s jurisdiction to apply, find a violation of and monitor any other
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned has been received
with scepticism and fear. International law scholars, especially (African) scholars writ-
ing extensively over the years on the African system on human rights, treat Article
3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR as a problematic occurrence, a flaw in the design,
or even a mistake in the drafting process.7 They argue that if the Court extends its
jurisdiction over treaties other than the African Charter onHuman and People’s Rights
(‘the Charter’ or ACHPR),8 this will lead to jurisprudential chaos9 andwill undermine
the formation of the African corpus juris.10 However, the ACtHPR has proved itself
willing to exercise its material jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent. It regularly
1 9 June 1998, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPRIPROT(III).
2 ‘The Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified
by the States concerned’.
3 1950, ETS 5, see Article 32.
4 1969, OAS TS 36, see Article 62.
5 Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle’ (1999) 31 New York
University Journal International Law & Policy 709 at 721-2; Alter, Helfer and McAllister, ‘A New International
Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice’ (2013) 107 American
Journal International Law 737 at 738.
6 Higgins, ‘Foreword’ in Sands, Mackenzie and Shany (eds),Manual on International Courts and Tribunals, 1st
edn (1999) at vii.
7 For example, Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd edn (2012) at 439, n 185; Heyns, ‘The
African Regional Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal
155 at 167. Cf. Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights
Quarterly 342 at 354.
8 1981, CAB/LEG/67 3 Rev. 5(1982); 21 ILM 58.
9 Heyns, supra n 7 at 167.
10 Ibid.; Mujuzi, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Its Protection of the Right to a Fair
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examines and pronounces on breaches of UN, regional and sub-regional treaties on
human rights, and orders States to comply with their obligations under those treaties.
Curiously, not much has been written since 2013, when the Court started functioning
and delineating the contours of its jurisdiction.11
In this article I discuss the case law of the Court since 2013 and the ways in which
it has construed its jurisdiction. The case law of the Economic Community of West
African States Community Court of Justice (ECCJ), which also applies other human
rights treaties (see Sections 3B(ii) and 3C(ii) below), is also brought into specific
parts of the discussion for the purpose of further illuminating the ACtHPR’s practice.
Contrary tomainstream scholarship, I submit that theACtHPR’s different treaty design
forms new opportunities and introduces a welcome difference in judicial dispute settle-
ment. A large part of the criticism and scepticism towards theCourt’s broad jurisdiction
has inherited a tradition of exaggerated and counterproductive anxiety regardingwhere
the limitations of a specialized and/or regional court lie—even when, as is the case of
theACtHPR, the court is explicitly authorized to interpret andapplyother treaties.This
anxiety is connected to the limitations of the jurisdiction of regional and/or specialized
international courts (on human rights) and the (alleged) ensuing risks of interpreting
and developing international law.
It should be noted that the ACtHPR forms part of a series of developments in
the judicial settlement of international disputes. Although the multiplication of inter-
national courts has taken place to a great extent on the basis of ‘templates’ used to
design other courts,12 novelties have found their way onto this legal landscape. Such
novelties include the emergence of blended models of adjudication;13 the creation
of courts melding economic and human rights matters into a single jurisdiction;14
and the establishment of international courts on human rights, which are entrusted to
11 Some few, recent works are Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 63; Alter,
Gathii and Helfer, ‘Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and
Consequences’ (2016) 27 European Journal International Law 293; Mujuzi, supra n 10; Zschirnt, ‘Locking
in Human Rights in Africa: Analyzing State Accession to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’
(2018) 19Human Rights Review 97; Ondo, ‘Les Opinions Séparées des Juges à la Cour Africaine des Droit
de l’Homme et des Peuples’ (2015) 104 Revue trimistrielle des droits de l’homme 941.
12 For example, international economic courts tend to follow the model of either the Court of Justice of the
European Union or the World Trade Organisation, and international human rights courts follow the old
or the new model of the ECtHR: see Romano, Alter and Sebregondi, ‘Illustrations: A Reader’s Guide’ in
Romano, Alter and Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook on International Adjudication (2014) 27 at 30; Alter,
The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (2014) at 87-91.
13 For instance, the options under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 1833 UNTS 3
(UNCLOS) to resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal on the Law of
the Sea or to a (special) arbitral tribunal: see Articles 287 and 288UNCLOS. Another example is theWorld
Trade Organization model under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which ranges from arbitration to
the Appellate Body. See, in general, on the developments which seem to (partly) change the physiognomy
of dispute settlement, Murphy, ‘International Judicial Bodies for Resolving Disputes between States’ in
Romano, Alter and Shany, supra n 12, 181 at 192-3, 203; and Sands, ‘Introduction and Acknowledgments’
in Mackenzie et al. (eds),Manual on International Courts and Tribunals, 2nd edn (2010) at xii–xiii.
14 For example, the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (Articles 9(1)
and 16 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Economic Community Court of Justice, 6 July 1991) or the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights: see Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
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exercise their jurisdiction over more than one human rights treaty.15 It is puzzling to
account for the emergence of these new institutions within the context of the existing
categories of dispute settlement.16 The question, therefore, is whether we are to discuss
and assess novel institutions against only the criteria and experience of existing bodies,
or shall we also account for and appreciate the foregoing bodies in new light. The
present discussion should also be read in light of the question of whether we duly value
difference and particularity, in times of emphasizing convergence and harmonization
across human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of international courts and bodies.17
The following analysis is structured in three parts. The second part elucidates the
meaning of the qualifications attached to the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction as per Article 3(1)
of the Protocol to the ACHPR. The meaning of a ‘human rights treaty’ presents itself
with some surprising difficulties. The construction of the Court’s jurisdiction needs to
be cautiously grounded in the text of its constitutive instruments while, concurrently,
limitations on theACtHPR’s jurisdiction cannot bepresumed to exist, given theCourt’s
obligation to fulfill its mandate. The third part of this analysis critically assesses the
arguments that the Court’s broad jurisdiction leads to ‘jurisprudential chaos’. This
vague claim is tied to three concrete legal issues: first, the anxiety of forum shopping;
second, the anxiety that theACtHPR—aregional and specialized international court—
monitors other human rights treaties; and, third, the anxiety of undermining African
human rights law, by either risking its specificity or by fragmenting it. I argue that these
concerns are over-emphasized. The discussion underlines the shifting authority of spe-
cialized and/or regional courts; the need not to overstress but to appreciate positively
instances of divergence; and the consideration of new conceptual and geographical
topoi, in which international law is to be found and produced.
Still, some of the legal issues raised regarding the ACtHPR’s wide jurisdiction con-
tainmerit. Interestingly, the case lawof theACtHPRsuggests that itmaybedeveloping a
policy of judicial self-restraint bynot examining all of the claims submittedby applicants
regarding violations of other human rights treaties. Procedural economy, the Court’s
competence in shaping the subject of a dispute and the possibility of making a choice
of applicable law are distinct bases upon which propriety considerations could be
introduced to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, the risk of undermining
the specificity of African human rights law is a valid concern but it is shown that this
risk is more likely to materialize not as a result of the ACtHPR’s broad jurisdiction, but
in the context of the interpretation process.
15 The Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice and the Arab Court on
Human Rights share this feature with the ACtHPR. According to Article 16(1) of the Statute of the Arab
Court of Human Rights (which has not yet started to function), the Court has jurisdiction ‘over all suits
and conflicts resulting from the implementation and interpretation of the Arab Charter of Human Rights, or
any other Arab convention in the field of Human Rights involving a member State’ (emphases added; unofficial
translation), adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States, Ministers of Foreign Affairs during its
142nd session by Resolution 7790, available at: www.acihl.org [last accessed 17March 2019).
16 Romano, ‘A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions’ (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute
Settlement 241 at 248.
17 See, for example, Buckley, Donald and Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights
Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems (2016); and Çali, Madsen and Viljoen, ‘Comparative
Regional Human Rights Regimes: Defining a Research Agenda’ (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitu-
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The article concludes by underlining that we cannot conceptualize the new and
novel according to the standards of the old and prevalent. It is not only that we need
to think anew about a different international court—the ACtHPR. Conversely, the
ACtHPR is also an invitation to rethink how we approach both old and new interna-
tional courts and to pave new ways forward in international judicial settlement.18
2. CLARIFYINGTHEAFRICANCOURTOFHUMANANDPEOPLES’
RIGHTS’ JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET AND APPLY OTHER
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
The preparatory work of the Protocol to the ACHPR does not give any indication of
why the Court was entrusted with such a broad mandate to interpret and apply other
human rights treaties.19 Given the lengthy negotiations over the creation of the Court
dating back to the 1960s,20 it is unlikely that Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR
was a mistake in the drafting stage.21 This conclusion is also supported by the equally
wide jurisdiction accorded to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which
will merge in the future with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.22 The
drafters, perhaps, thought that the requirement to make a separate optional declaration
accepting theCourt’s competence (underArticle 34(6) of the Protocol to theACHPR)
balanced out the Court’s unusually broad jurisdiction. Thirty out of 54 African
States have ratified the Protocol to the ACHPR,23 and nine thus far (Burkina Faso,
Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Tunisia and The Gambia) have
consented to the Court’s competence to receive complaints from individuals and non-
governmental organizations.24
This section argues that the text of Article 3(1) of the Protocol to theACHPR leaves
little room to question the Court’s material jurisdiction to decide complaints regarding
an alleged violation of a human rights treaty inAfrica (regional or sub-regional) or at the
UN level.25 Various arguments have been put forward to limit the Court’s mandate to
hear such complaints, but a restrictive construction of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
18 Murray perceptively criticizes how international lawyers have failed to focus on and use African institutions
as positive examples in human rights law and international adjudication: see Murray, ‘International Human
Rights: Neglect of Perspectives from African Institutions’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative Law
Quarterly 193.
19 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 439.
20 For a brief historical overview, see Krisch, ‘The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights’ [1998] Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 713 at 716-7.
21 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 439 n 185, suggests this.
22 See supra n 14. The Protocol to theACHPRwas replaced by the Protocol on the Statute of theAfricanCourt
of Justice andHumanRights on 1 July 2008, whichmerges the AfricanCourt onHuman andPeoples’ Rights
and theCourt of Justiceof theAfricanUnion intoone single court.However, theProtocol to theStatuteof the
AfricanCourt of Justice andHumanRights has not yet entered into force: see, in general, Viljoen, supra n 7 at
435-9.Article 28 reads: ‘All legal disputes concerning, amongothers, the interpretation and the applicationof
the African Charter, the Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or any other legal instrument relating to
human rights ratified by the States Parties concerned; any question of international law.’
23 See: www.african-court.org [last accessed 16March 2019].
24 Rwanda withdrew its 2013 declaration in February 2016. The withdrawal took effect in March 2017, see:
www.african-court.org [last accessed 16March 2019].
25 Cf. Article 16(1) of the Statute of the Arab Court of Human Rights, which refers only to ‘any other Arab
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materie cannot be presumed, since this would prevent the Court from discharging
its role.
A. The Meaning of a ‘Human Rights Instrument Ratified
by the States Concerned’
Article 3(1)of theProtocol to theACHPRclearly stipulates that theCourtmay exercise
its jurisdiction over any other relevant human rights instrument insofar as it is ratified
by the State(s) concerned. Applicants have brought complaints regarding alleged vio-
lations of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, even though
the UDHR is not a treaty.26 The Court has treated such complaints inconsistently.
Although theCourt inTanganyikaLawSocietydidnot rule out thepossibility of examin-
ing such complaints,27 it subsequentlymaintained that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
a claim concerning an alleged breach of the UDHR, although the UDHR can be used
as a source of inspiration for interpreting the Charter.28 However, in 2018 the Court
found that the deprivation of the applicant’s nationality was contrary to Article 15(2)
of the UDHR, and it declared a violation in the operative provisions of its judgment.29
B. The Meaning of the Qualifications
‘States Concerned’ and ‘Relevant’
An argument raised with regard to limiting the material jurisdiction of the Court con-
cerns the construction of the qualification ‘instrument ratified by the States concerned’
(emphasis added) as referring to instruments ratified by allparties to the Protocol to the
ACHPR, and not only by the respondent State before the Court.30 This idea cannot be
supported by reference to the Court’s constitutive instruments. A careful reading of the
Protocol demonstrates that the expressions ‘State(s) concerned’31 and ‘States parties
to the Protocol’32 are employed in different ways—even within the context of a single
provision (for example,Article 25). IfArticle 3(1)hadmeant to set the requirement that
all State parties to the Protocol need to have ratified a human rights treaty, this would
have been stated explicitly.
It has alsobeen suggested that the term ‘relevant’ concernsonly treaties that explicitly
provide in their text that they are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.33 This suggestion,
however, is refuted by the fact that neither the African Charter nor the Protocol point
in this direction; additionally, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘relevant’ refers to
26 For example, ACtHPR, Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo & Burkinabe Human and Peoples’
Rights Movement v Burkina Faso Application No 013/2011, 28 March 2014. A list of all judgments of the
ACtHPR is available at: www.african-court.org [last accessed 16March 2019].
27 ACtHPR, Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v
United Republic of Tanzania Application Nos 009 and 011/2011, 14 June 2013, at para 122.
28 ACtHPR, Frank David Omary and Others v The United Republic of Tanzania Application No 001/2012, 28
March 2014 at paras 19, 72-73.
29 ACtHPR,Anudo Ochieng Anudo v United Republic of TanzaniaApplicationNo 012/2015, 22March 2018 at
paras 88, 132(v).
30 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 438. TheConvention on the Rights of theChild 1989, 1577UNTS 3 (CRC)would still
fall under the Court’s jurisdiction.
31 Article 7 (sources of law), Article 3 (jurisdiction), Article 25, Article 26 Protocol to the ACHPR.
32 Article 12, Article 25(1), Article 30, Article 35(1) Protocol to the ACHPR.
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the subject matter of the complaint brought before the Court and the human rights
involved therein.34 This, of course, does not answer the question of how one is to
determine which human rights treaties are relevant. Although the meaning of the term
‘relevant’ appears to be uncomplicated, this ismisleading.35 For purposes of the present
discussion, it suffices to underline that it can be a burdensome task for the Court to
research systematically all possible relevant human rights treaties in every single case.
The applicants’ claims and submissions can be useful in this regard.
C. Back to the Basics: What is a Human Rights Treaty
(within the Meaning of Article 3 Protocol to the ACHPR)?
Certain qualifications attached to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction under Article 3
of the Protocol to the ACHPR may appear straightforward, but they are surprisingly
challenging. This is the case with the expression ‘human rights treaty’. The Court
had the opportunity early on in its case law to interpret and apply treaties whose
human rights classification was in dispute. In Tanganyika Law Society, the respondent
State, Tanzania, argued that the 1993 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States36 is not a human rights treaty within the meaning of Article 3
of the Protocol and, therefore, it did not fall in the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s
judgment did not address Tanzania’s objection. However, the former Vice-President of
the Court, FatsahOuguergouz, devoted the greater part of his Separate Opinion to this
issue.37 Themain thrust of theVice-President’s positionwas that theCourt should have
drawn a distinction between treaties which mainly dealt with the protection of human
rights and treaties which addressed other matters but contained provisions relating to
human rights. Treaties of the latter category placed obligations on State parties without
necessarily according subjective rights to individuals.38
TheCourt scrutinized thematter of themeaning of a ‘human rights treaty’ inActions
pour la protection de droits de l’homme.39 In this, the pressing question was whether
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance40 and the ECOWAS
Protocol onDemocracy andGoodGovernance supplementary to the Protocol relating
to theMechanism forConflict Prevention,Management andResolution41 were human
rights instruments within the meaning of Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR.42
According to theCourt, this question should be answered by examining the purpose(s)
34 Cf. the use of the term ‘relevant’ in Articles 5 and 31 (3)(c) Vienna Convention Law Treaties 1969, 1155
UNTS 331, in which it refers to the subject matter of a treaty or a treaty provision: see Villiger, Commentary
on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009) at 433.
35 For detailed discussion on how the ECtHR has (not) addressed in its case law the issue of what rules of
international law are relevant, seeRachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International LawRevisited: Insights,Good
Practices and Lessons to be Learned from theCase Law of the EuropeanCourt of HumanRights’ (2015) 28
Leiden Journal of International Law 863 at 876-9.
36 1993, 2373 UNTS 233 (‘ECOWAS Revised Treaty’).
37 Tanganyika Law Society, supra n 27 at Separate Opinion of Vice-President Fatsah Ouguergouz, para 1.
38 Ibid. at para 15.
39 ACtHPR, Actions pour la protection des droits de l’homme (APDH) v Republic of Cote d’Ivoire Application No
001/2014, 18 November 2016.
40 30 January 2007 (‘African Charter on Democracy’), available at: au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-
democracy-elections-and-governance [last accessed 16March 2019].
41 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 (2001) (‘ECOWASDemocracy Protocol’).
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of these treaties. Suchpurposes ‘are reflected either by anexpress enunciationof the sub-
jective rights of individuals or by mandatory obligations on State parties for the conse-
quent enjoyment of the said rights.’43 The conclusionwas that these treaties qualified as
human rights treaties because the State parties’ obligation to establish independent and
impartial electoral bodies is aimed at implementing the human rights provided under
the ACHPR.44 This reasoning is tenuous, and prompts the following observations.
First, it is not clear fromActions pour laProtection deDroits de l’Hommehow theCourt
inferred that States’ obligations under these two treaties are aimed at implementing
rights guaranteed in the ACHPR. The ECOWAS Democracy Protocol furnishes no
obvious link with human rights, either in the preamble or in its main text. The African
Charter on Democracy does contain certain references to the promotion of human
rights in connection with good governance and democracy, although these references
are vague.45 Moreover, even thoughStates parties to theAfricanCharter onDemocracy
have undertaken the obligations to implement it in accordance with respect for human
rights and democratic principles (Article 3(1)) and to ensure that citizens enjoy human
rights (Article 6), there is no specific mention of the ACHPR or human rights, such
as the right to political participation. There is little, if any, evidence to substantiate
the ACtHPR’s position that the obligation incumbent on State parties to the African
Charter onDemocracy to establish independent and impartial electoral bodies is aimed
at implementing human rights under the ACHPR.The commitment of the State parties to
the African Charter on Democracy to hold regular, transparent, free and fair elections
(Article 17), and to implementing the said Charter in accordance with the principle of
effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in the
governance of public affairs (Article 3(7)), are not compelling arguments in themselves
either.
Second, even if the Court’s conclusion were sound and well reasoned, the fact that
a treaty and/or a treaty provision was intended to implement a human right is not, on
its own, a determinative criterion for establishing that a given treaty is a human rights
treaty. For instance, if a bilateral investment treaty implements aspects of the right to
property, does this make it a human rights treaty within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Protocol to the ACHPR?
Third, in Actions pour la protection des droits de l’Homme,46 the Court cross-
referenced theMathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium47 judgment of the ECtHR, which
reached a similar conclusion with respect to Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR
43 Ibid. at para 57.
44 Ibid. at para 63. See also the arguments put forward by the African Institute for International Law, ibid. at
paras 53-4, when asked by the Court to give its legal view on the issue.
45 The fifth preambular paragraph states that the Member States of the AU are ‘[c]ommitted to promote the
universal values and principles of democracy, good governance, human rights and the right to development’.
Article 2(1) reads ‘The objectives of this Charter are to: . . . Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the
universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights’. Article 4(1) reads: ‘State Parties
shall commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle of the rule of law and human rights.’
46 Supra n 39 at para 64.
47 Application No 9267/81, Merits, 2 March 1987 (Plenary). Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR 1952,
ETS 009, reads: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
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(Article 3AP1).Mathieu-Mohin andClerfayt concerned the question ofwhetherArticle
3 P1 gave rise to individual rights that are automatically conferred on everyone, or
gave rise only to obligations between States.48 Thus, the ECtHR in Mathieu-Mohin
and Clerfayt and the ACtHPR in Actions pour la protection de droits de l’homme
may have reached the same conclusion, but the text of the treaties concerned and
the Courts’ reasoning differ substantially. In contrast to the ACtHPR’s reasoning,
the ECtHR showed clear evidence confirming that Article 3 P1 confers rights on
individuals.49
Since the ACtHPR has not elucidated questions which go directly to the core of
its material jurisdiction in a satisfactory fashion, the meaning of ‘human rights treaty’
in the context of Article 3 of the Protocol merits further discussion. The analysis
below highlights criteria that are more concrete by drawing a distinction between
treaties whose main purpose is the protection of human rights and treaties that contain
provisions relating to human rights although this is not their main purpose.
(i) A treaty whose main purpose is the protection of human rights
A valid starting point for a discussion of the meaning of ‘human rights treaty’ under
Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR is to examine the object and purpose of a
given treaty. A treaty may have more than one object and purpose.50 The purpose of a
treaty refers to its raison d’être—the reason(s) it was created in the first place—whereas
the object of a treaty refers to the reciprocal exchange of rights and obligations among
parties to the treaty.51 If theprotectionof human rights is a treaty’smainpurpose (orone
of its main purposes), the treaty falls under the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction ratione materiae
(subject, of course, to the other qualifications set out in Article 3 of the Protocol to the
ACHPR).
(ii) The object of a treaty: A treaty whose main purpose is not the protection of
human rights but contains provisions relating to human rights
The next question is whether a treaty can be regarded as a human rights treaty for
the purposes of Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR even if its main purpose is
not the protection of human rights.52 The ACtHPR, in Actions pour la Protection de
Droits de l’Homme, stated that if a treaty provision expressly confers subjective rights
on individuals, or if such rights derive from obligations incumbent on States, then
this treaty falls under its jurisdiction. The IACtHR’s approach lends further support
to the position. The IACtHR, in the Advisory Opinion ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, was asked to clarify its advisory function with
48 Ibid. at para 48.
49 Ibid. at para 49. Article 5 P1 provides that the provisions of its Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall be regarded as
additional Articles to the ECHR. The ECtHR also highlighted that Article 3 P1 is of great importance to
fulfilling the aim of the ECHR as reflected in the Preamble, according to which fundamental human rights
are best maintained by an effective political democracy: see ibid. at para 47.
50 Villiger, supra n 34 at 427.
51 Ibid. at 248-9; Boisson de Chazournes, La Rosa andMoiseMbengue, ‘Article 18’ in Corten and Klein (eds),
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2011) 369 at 383-8.
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regard to interpreting ‘other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the
American states’.53 It opined that a treaty is subject to its advisory jurisdiction as long as
it contains provisions concerning human rights, even if the protection of human rights
is not one of that treaty’s main purposes.54 Nonetheless, the pronouncements of the
IACtHR should be appreciated with the caveat that the IACtHR endowed itself with
a wide jurisdiction in the exercise of its advisory function.55 One should therefore be
cautious about ‘transplanting’ the ACtHPR’s reasoning adopted in the exercise of its
advisory jurisdiction when discussing its contentious jurisdiction.56
Turning now to the precise criteria for determining when such a treaty can be
regarded as a human rights treaty, certain scholars have asserted that even when a treaty
is not a human rights treaty, it may still have a human rights dimension or human rights
implications.57 Similarly, the IACtHR held that it is empowered to invoke any treaty
insofar as it has a bearing upon, affects or is of interest to the protection of human
rights.58 But how is one to establish and assess such human rights implications, or the
human rights dimensions of a non-human rights treaty? Almost any treaty, including a
trade agreement, has certain implications concerning human rights. Is this a sufficient
basis for the ACtHPR to exercise jurisdiction over such treaties? If one follows this line
of thought, theACtHPRcould, in practice, hear complaints regarding alleged violations
53 According to Article 64(1) IACHR, ‘The member states of the Organization may consult the Court
regarding the interpretationof thisConventionor of other treaties concerning theprotectionof human rights
in the American states.’
54 OC-1/82, ‘Other Treaties’ Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Article 64 American Conven-
tion on Human Rights) IACtHR Series A 1 (1982) at para 11; OC-16/99, The Right to Information on
Consular Assistance in the Framework of Guarantees of the Due Process of Law IACtHR Series A 16 (1999) at
paras 72, 76.
55 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, ibid. at Concurring Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade,
para 29.
56 Although this article focuses only on the contentious jurisdiction of the ACtHPR, the present analysis
regarding the meaning of ‘human rights treaty/instrument’ applies also to the Court’s advisory function.
According to Article 4(1) Protocol to the ACHPR ‘the Court may provide an opinion on any legal
matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments’. However, the Court in two
different orders relating to separate requests for an advisory opinion on the same legal questions adopted
a very restrictive construction of its advisory function: see ACtHPR, Request No 1/2015, Request for
Advisory Opinion by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the Legal Defence & Assistance Project
(LEDAP), the Civil Resource Development & Documentation Center (CIRDDOC) and the Women Advocates
Documentation Center (WARDC), Order, 29 November 2015 at para 18; ACtHPR, Request No 1/2014,
Request forAdvisoryOpinion by theCoalition for the InternationalCriminalCourt, the LegalDefence&Assistance
Project (LEDAP), the Civil Resource Development & Documentation Center (CIRDDOC) and the Women
Advocates Documentation Center (WARDC), Order, 5 June 2015 at para 13. The Court’s laconic reasoning
does not give a satisfactory answer as to why the issues raised by the authors do not qualify as a legal matter
relating to the Charter. In these instances, one would not even have to address the question of whether
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 1998, 2187 UNTS 38544 is a human rights
instrument; demonstrating that States’ obligations under the ICC Statute raise legal issues vis-à-vis the
ACHPRwould arguably suffice.Cf. Viljoen, supra n 11 at 91-3 and inRequestNo 1/2015 forAdvisoryOpinion
at Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz, para 17-2.
57 Naldi andMagliveras, ‘Reinforcing theAfrican SystemofHumanRights: TheProtocol on theEstablishment
of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 16Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 431 at
435, n 26; Van Der Mei, ‘The New African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an Effective
Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 113 at
119-20, n 46; Heyns, supra n 7 at 167.
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of a potentially unlimited number of treaties. Consequently, the foregoing considera-
tions are not particularly helpful, since they establish only a tenuous connection with
the concept of a human rights treaty. One way forward is to focus on the object of the
treaty by relying on specific treaty provisions, rather than on a treaty’s human rights
implications in the abstract.59
The matter is straightforward when a treaty contains provisions which confer direct
entitlements and claims on individuals. However, this does not necessarily mean that
these individual rights also qualify as human rights. A relevant example is the interpre-
tation of Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),60
which concerns the privileges relating to a consular post and, in particular, issues of
communication and contact with nationals of the sending State who are in prison,
custody or detention. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the LaGrand case,61
having found that Article 36 of the VCCR confers rights on individuals, concluded
that those rights are not human rights. The ICJ reaffirmed in an obiter dictum in the
Avena case62 that neither the text, nor the object and purpose of the VCCR, nor any
indication in the travaux préparatoires supported the argument that the VCCR confers
human rights on individuals. Interestingly, the IACtHR, in The Right to Information
AdvisoryOpinion, found that the rights contained inArticle 36of theVCCRarehuman
rights.63 Therefore, there are instances in which it is not clear whether individual rights
are human rights.
It can be equally difficult to assess whether or not a treaty that imposes specific
obligations on State parties confers specific rights and claims on individuals. Even if the
fulfilment of these obligations leads to the enjoyment of specific rights and individuals
benefit from the application of a treaty,64 it does not always follow that individuals
derive these rights. States may undertake to comply with treaty obligations in relation
to individuals without conferring direct entitlements on them.65 This is a matter to be
decided on a case-by-case basis by ascertaining the object of the treaty and interpreting
the exchange of rights and obligations among State parties. A relevant example is
whether the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption66
confers rights on individuals and, consequently, whether it can be considered a human
rights instrument according to Article 3 of the Protocol to ACHPR. It has been argued
59 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 436-8.
60 1963, 596 UNTS 261.
61 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America)Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 466 at para 78.
62 Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) Merits, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 2004, 12 at para 124.
63 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, supra n 54 at paras 83-4, 85-7.
64 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH), supra n 39 at para 57.
65 Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, supra n 62 at para 139. See also Simma, ‘Human Rights
Treaties’ in Besson and d’Aspremont (eds),The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (2017)
872at 879-81.Another example is thequestionofwhether an individual canderive the rights to a remedy and
reparations from Article 4 CAT which, in principle, seems to prescribe only obligations upon State parties.
For the evolving interpretation of Article 4 CAT, see Nowak and McArthur, The United Nations Convention
Against Torture: A Commentary (2008) at 250-2.
66 11 July 2003, available at: au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-preventing-and-combating-
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that although provisions of the AU Convention on Corruption are framed mostly as
obligations placed on States, these obligations correspond to rights that can be claimed
by individuals.67 At first glance, the protection of human rights does not appear to be
one of themain purposes of theAUConvention onCorruption.The preamble contains
references to ‘removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights’ (eleventh paragraph), and the explicit reference to respect for human rights and
the Charter (fourth paragraph). Nonetheless these references are very vague, andmore
importantly they do not establish the promotion of human rights as one of the purposes
of the AU Convention on Corruption. It is rather the promotion of socio-economic
development, which, in turn, is supported by the removal of obstacles to the enjoyment
of human rights.68 Still, there are indications that the object of the treaty furnishes a
link to human rights. Pursuant to Article 3(2), State parties to the AU Convention
on Corruption undertake to respect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with
the ACHPR and other relevant human rights instruments. More specifically, Articles
13(3) and 14 provide the right to a fair trial, and Article 12(4) provides aspects of the
right to freedom of expression. However, with the exception of these two rights one
cannot make a convincing argument for inferring, in general, individual rights from
State obligations enshrined in the AUConvention on Corruption.
To conclude, Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR does not leave much room
to question the Court’s jurisdiction to decide complaints concerning other human
rights treaties. Despite the arguments that have been put forward in international law
scholarship, one cannot presume a restrictive construction of the Court’s jurisdiction
rationemateriae. Amore systematic and rigorous examination of themeaning of ‘human
rights treaty’ is expected of theCourt, especially since this is a prerequisite to exercise its
material jurisdiction.When a treaty does not have the protection of human rights as one
of its main purposes, a vague discussion concerning the human rights implications or
dimensionof that treaty is not informative in practice.The focus should rather beplaced
on the object of the treaty and specific treaty provision(s) in order to examine, first,
whether a treaty provision that imposes specific obligations on States confers specific
rights on individuals and, second, whether such individual rights qualify as human
rights.
3. THE ANXIETY OF ‘JURISPRUDENTIAL CHAOS’
Despite strong concerns encouraging the Court to refrain from exercising its juris-
diction over human rights treaties ratified by African States69 or to tailor its mandate
to the narrow scope of the jurisdiction of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (‘the Commission’ or AComHPR) examining only alleged violations
67 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 436.
68 According to Article 2(4), one of the objectives of the Convention is to ‘promote socio-economic devel-
opment by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and
political rights.’
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of the ACHPR,70 the ACtHPR has proceeded to fully explore the scope of its material
jurisdiction. Having discussed themeaning of the qualifications attached to the Court’s
jurisdiction, this section addresses scholars’ fears, namely that allowing complaints of
violations of a variety of human rights treaties to be brought before the Court will lead
to ‘jurisprudential chaos’.71 Jurisprudential chaos is a vague claim. The analysis in this
section ties this claim to three concrete legal issues underpinning the debate: first, the
anxiety of forumshopping in light of themultiplicity of international courts; second, the
anxiety of theACtHPRmonitoringother human rights treaties; and third, the anxiety of
threatening African human rights law. The analysis finds that the jurisprudential chaos
claim generally reflects an anxiety associated with repeatedly exaggerated concerns
regarding the limits of the jurisdiction of regional and/or specialized international
courts, and the ensuing risks to interpreting and developing international law.However,
some of the concerns raised merit further discussion.72 The case law of the Court
suggests that it may be developing a policy of judicial self-restraint by not examining all
of the submissions of the applicants regarding violations of other human rights treaties.
The case law of the ECCJ is also brought into specific aspects of the discussion below,
in order to shed some light on the ACtHPR’s practice.
A. The Anxiety of Forum Shopping
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ACtHPR allows applicants to submit complaints
regarding alleged violations of other human rights treaties in any of the following (non-
exhaustive) scenarios:
a) An applicant may bring a case claiming a violation of a right which is not pro-
tected under the ACHPR but is envisaged by another treaty ratified by the State
concerned, such as the right to housing under Article 11 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).73
b) An applicantmay rely on and allege a breach of a right which, although envisaged
in the ACHPR, is formulated in another treaty in a manner that ensures a higher
level of protection. This may be due to a broader protective scope of this right,
70 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 438. According to Article 2 ACHPR and Article 8 Protocol to the ACHPR, the African
Court complements the protective function of the Commission. However, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Court (April 2010), this complementary relationship has no impact on the scope of the
complaint, the Court’s jurisdiction or the laws applicable when the Commission refers a case to the Court.
Moreover, if this line of reasoningwere to be followed, it would also entail different treatment of applications
before the Court depending on whether a case had been referred by the Commission or submitted by other
parties in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol to the ACHPR.
71 Heyns, supra n 7 at 167.
72 Van der Mei, supra n 57 at 119-20; Krisch, supra n 20 at 722-4.
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or a more restricted limitation attached thereto.74 Lohé Issa Konaté75 is a case in
point.
c) An applicant may claim a violation of a human right which is protected in the
same way under both the ACHPR and another treaty, but no mechanism is
envisaged or is available to the applicant under that other treaty. For example,
many cases have already been brought against Tanzania with regard to violations
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),76 since
Tanzania has not ratified the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.77
d) Finally, an applicant may choose to bring a complaint before the ACtHPR
(instead of or in addition to another international body) as part of a litigation
strategy (for example, considerations of physical proximity to a forum and
litigation costs).78
The Court’s case law demonstrates that applicants are familiar with the claims and
arguments that they can raise in connection with other human rights treaties. The
Court has examined alleged violations of a series of treaties, including the ICCPR,79
the ICESCR,80 the ECOWAS Revised Treaty,81 the African Charter on Democracy,82
the ECOWASDemocracy Protocol,83 theConvention on the Elimination of All Forms
ofDiscriminationAgainstWomen (CEDAW),84 theProtocol to theAfricanCharter on
74 Mbondenyi, ‘Invigorating the African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights through Institutional Main-
streaming and Rationalisation’ (2009) 27 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 451 at 470; Udombana,
‘Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never’ (2000) 3 Yale Human
Rights & Development Law Journal 45 at 91.
75 ACtHPR, Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina FasoApplication No 004/2013, 5 December 2014. See also ACtHPR,
Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Republic of RwandaApplicationNo 003/2014, 24November 2017 at paras 133,
136, 140 (confirming the Lohé Issa Konaté case).
76 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
77 Tanganyika Law Society, supra n 27; ACtHPR, Alex Thomas v United Republic of Tanzania Application
No 005/2013, 20 November 2015; ACtHPR, Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others v United Republic of
Tanzania Application No 006/2013, 18 March 2016; ACtHPR, Mohamed Abubakari v United Republic of
Tanzania Application No 007/2013, 3 June 2016; Frank David Omary and Others, supra n 28.
78 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 438; Helfer, ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’ (1999) 48University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 285.
79 Tanganyika Law Society, supra n 27 at para 76; Lohé Issa Konaté, supra n 75 at para 9; Alex Thomas, supra n
77;Mohamed Abubakari, supra n 77; Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme, supra n 39; Abdoulaye
Nikiema and Others, supra n 26.
80 Frank David Omary and Others, supra n 28 at para 76; ACtHPR, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights v Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012, 26May 2017 at para 2.
81 Lohé Issa Konaté, supra n 75 at para 12; Abdoulaye Nikiema and Others, supra n 26.
82 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme, supra n 39.
83 Ibid.
84 1979, 1249 UNTS 13. ACtHPR, Association Pour le Progrès et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes
(APDF) and The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Mali Application
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Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (‘Maputo Protocol’)85
and the African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child.86
There are instances in which applicants have submitted violations of other relevant
human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned without invoking a violation
of the Charter. In the Frank David Omary andAlex Thomas cases, the applicants argued
a violation of the UDHR without mentioning any right under the Charter. The Court
clarified that although it had no jurisdiction over the UDHR, it did have jurisdiction to
decide complaints concerning either theCharter or other relevant human rights treaties
(or both).87 On other occasions, the applicants submitted their complaints without
referring to specific treaties. Tanzania, in the Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and Kennedy
Owino Onyachi cases,88 raised preliminary objections ratione materiae arguing that the
applicants had not invoked any human rights treaties. The Court maintained that the
factual basis of the alleged violations was sufficient to ascertain whether the complaints
fallwithin the scopeof specific rights under theCharter orotherhuman rights treaties.89
In Kennedy Owino Onyachi, the Court found, on its own initiative, that the applicants’
submissions contained alleged violations of the Charter and the ICCPR (even though
the Court did not proceed to discuss the ICCPR on the merits).90 This is a sound
approach, since questions pertaining to the jurisdiction rationemateriae of international
courts are examined proprio motu.91 However, in the recent Association Pour le Progrès
et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes (APDF) and The Institute for Human
Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Mali judgment,92 the Court examined
and decided alleged violations of other treaties on human rights without bringing the
ACHPR into play. It is the first case in which the Court decided a complaint strictly on
the basis of other treaties on human rights without implicating the Charter.
It becomes clear that the ACtHPR can be—and, indeed, is—used as a forum for
bringing complaints regarding other human rights treaties. The argument against this
practice is that the existence and use of multiple venues for adjudicating international
(human rights) claims may lead courts to favour approaches to tailor their ‘clientele’,
85 11 July 2003, adopted by the 2ndOrdinary Session of the Assembly of the AfricanUnion (AU), available at:
www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/[last accessed 16 March 2019]. See also Association Pour le
Progrès et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes, ibid. at paras 9, 78, 95, 115, 125, 135.
86 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49. Association Pour le Progrès et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes, ibid. at
paras 9, 78, 115, 125, 135.
87 Frank David Omary and Others, supra n 28 at paras 74, 77; Alex Thomas, supra n 77 at para 45.
88 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others, supra n 77 at para 52; ACtHPR, Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Others v
United Republic of Tanzania Application No 003/20015, 28 September 2017 at paras 35-6.
89 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others, ibid. at paras 57–58; Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Others, ibid. at paras
35–36, 156–157. See also FrankDavidOmary andOthers, supra n 28 at paras 74, 77;Alex Thomas, supra n 77
at para 45; ACtHPR, Peter Joseph Chacha v United Republic of TanzaniaApplicationNo 003/2012, 28March
2014 at para 114.
90 Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Others, supra n 88 at paras 35-6.
91 Shelton, ‘Jura Novit Curia in International Human Rights Tribunals’ in Boschiero et al. (eds), International
Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (2013) 189.
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and may increase the risk of conflicting judgments.93 Forum shopping has acquired a
negative connotation, even though it is at least equally arguable that the term ‘forum
shopping’ is misleading and it does not belong to the lexicon of international law
due to the latter’s decentralized nature.94 Choice of forum is the inevitable conse-
quence of the specialization and deepening of international law coupled with the
multiplicity of international courts and other bodies. The multiplicity of international
courts embodies the complexity of relations between States (and other actors).95
Increasing third-party settlement of international disputes through law-based forums
makes (human rights-related) disputes justiciable, and paves the way for authoritative
pronouncements of international law. The risk of diverging interpretations of the law
is largely exaggerated.96 Choice of forum enables creativity through dialogue among
courts.97 The possibility of multiple international courts being able to hear a dispute
(or aspects thereof) not only proves beneficial to the individuals concerned, but also
entails a healthy level of competition among courts, thereby improving the quality of
their rulings and encouraging them to keep an eye on one another.98 It is frequently
argued that States could take advantage of differing views of international courts and
bodies on human rights by acknowledging the milder view, and the lowest common
denominator in human rights protection.99 Yet, there is no State practice or precedent
to support this claim.100
93 For example, see Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the ICJ, to the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Proliferation of International Judi-
cial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order’, 27 October 2000, at 3-4, available at:
www.icj-cij.org/en/statements-by-the-president [last accessed 16March 2019].
94 See in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo)Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2010, 639 at Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para 240.
95 Brownlie, ‘Blaine Sloan Lecture: The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Practice’ (1995)
7 Pace University School of Law International Law Review 257 at 276.
96 Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge S.M. Schwebel,
President of the ICJ, 27 October 1998, at 4, available at: www.icj-cij.org/en/statements-by-the-president
[last accessed 16March 2019].
97 Kingsbury, ‘Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?’
(1999)31NewYorkUniversity Journal International Law&Policy679at 681-2, 686;Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation
orUnification: SomeConcludingRemarks’ (1999) 31NewYorkUniversity Journal International Law&Policy
919 at 925; Brownlie, supra n 95; Murungi and Gallinetti, ‘The Role of Sub-Regional Courts in the African
Human Rights System’ (2010) 13 SUR—International Journal on Human Rights 119 at 131.
98 Pauwelyn and Salles, ‘Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible
Solutions’ (2009) 42Cornell International Law Journal 77 at 80; Brownlie, ibid. at 276;Meron,HumanRights
Law-making in the United Nations (1986) at 241.
99 For instance, Meron, ibid.
100 Helfer, supra n 78 at 357-8. Helfer correctly highlights the fact that a State would not be able to pursue the
lowest denominator among different rulings and interpretations by different courts and bodies since, inmost
cases, human rights treaties contain amore favourable protection clause preventingStates fromrestricting the
enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized in treaty A by virtue of another treaty. Interestingly,
this does not apply in the case of the ACtHPR since the African Charter is one of the very few human rights
treaties which does not contain a more favourable protection clause. However, if a State party to the Charter
is also a party to another human rights treaty containing such a clause, then that State would be obliged not
to invoke a lower level of protection with regard to its obligations under that treaty. For examples of more






/hrlr/article-abstract/19/2/255/5536883 by guest on 05 August 2019
The Case of an African Court with Material Jurisdiction of Global Scope • 271
There is little evidence regulating the phenomenon of bringingmultiple claims over
the same or a similar matter, successively or simultaneously, before different bodies.101
In the absence of explicit regulation of choice of forumby States (for example, by insert-
ing a specific treaty clause), States and individuals may exercise all options available
to them, including choice of forum, simultaneous petitioning and successive petition-
ing.102 The ACHPR is interpreted as allowing all these options, with the exception of
cases that have been settled by the States involved (Article 56(7) ACHPR).103 This
suggests that the admissibility criterion requires not only the finality of the settlement,
but also settlement on an inter-State level (thereby excluding claims by individuals
against the State).104 Moreover, successive petitioning concerning claims under the
ICCPR is permitted; it is allowed if the Human Rights Committee (HRC) is satisfied
that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure concurrently.105
B. The Anxiety ofMonitoringOtherHuman Rights Treaties
TheACtHPRsystematically applies, andfinds violationsof, otherhuman rights treaties,
including regional, sub-regional and global. It also monitors their implementation,
and orders the respondent States to comply with their respective obligations. Some
examples from the case law are the following. In Lohé Issa Konaté, the Court found
that Burkina Faso’s Penal Code (prescribing custodial and non-custodial sentences for
defamation), as well as the sentencing of the applicant to imprisonment and excessive
fines, were contrary not only to the requirements of Article 9 of the Charter but also
to Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 66(2)(c) ECOWAS Revised Treaty concerning
the rights of journalists.106 In another 2017 freedom of expression case, Rwanda was
held in violation of both Article 9(2) of the Charter and Article 19 of the ICCPR.107
In Actions pour la protection des droits de l’homme, the Court proclaimed that Côte
d’Ivoire violated its obligations both to establish impartial and independent electoral
bodies and to provide equal protection under the law, as enshrined in Article 3 of the
ACHPR, Articles 10(3) and 17 of the African Charter on Democracy, Article 3 of
ECOWAS Democracy Protocol and Article 26 of the ICCPR.108 Côte d’Ivoire was
ordered to bring its domestic law in compliance with the requirements of these treaties.
In Anudo Ochieng Anudo, Tanzania was found to have arbitrarily expelled the applicant
in violation of Article 7 of the Charter and Article 14 of the ICCPR.109 In a different
101 Lowe, ‘Overlapping Jurisdictions in International Tribunals’ (1999) 20 Australian Yearbook of International
Law 191 at 201; Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2004).
102 Helfer, supra n 78 at 304.
103 Article 56(7) ACHPR sets as an admissibility requirement that ‘communications relating to Human and
Peoples’ rights referred to in Article 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they . . . do
not deal with cases which have been settled by those States involved in accordance with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or the provisions of the
present Charter’ (emphasis added).
104 Helfer, supra n 78 at 306.
105 Article 5(2)(a) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1996, 999 UNTS 171, reads: ‘The Committee shall not
consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that . . .the same matter is not
being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement’.
106 Lohé Issa Konaté, supra n 75 at paras 164, 167, 170, 176.
107 See also Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza, supra n 75 at paras 163, 173(ix).
108 Supra n 39 at paras 135, 151.
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cluster of cases, Tanzania’s systematic failure to protect various aspects of the right to a
fair trial led to a violation of Article 7 of the ACHPR and Article 14 of the ICCPR.110
In 2018, the domestic legislation of the Republic of Mali was found to be inconsistent
with the State’s obligations under CEDAW,111 theMaputo Protocol112 and the African
Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child.113 The Court ordered the Republic of
Mali to amend its domestic law in conformity with the standards set by the foregoing
treaties.
It is worthwhile to note that the ECCJ, in tunewith theACtHPR, construes itsmate-
rial jurisdiction to include alleged violations of the UDHR114 and UN human rights
treaties to which ECOWAS Member States are parties,115 such as the ICCPR,116 the
ICESCR,117 the Convention Against Torture (CAT)118 and CEDAW.119 The SERAP
case is the only instance in which a State challenged the ECCJ’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae.120 Nigeria argued that the ECCJ did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on
alleged violations of the ICCPR and ICESCR because, first, the Nigerian Constitution
110 The rights to be heard and to defend oneself, to be tried within a reasonable length of time and to free legal
aid are enunciated inAlexThomas, supra n 77 at para 124. See alsoACtHPR, Interpretation of the Judgment of
20 November 2015—Alex Thomas v United Republic of Tanzania Application No 001/2017, 28 September
2017 at paras 38–39. The obligation to provide free legal assistance and to communicate all the elements of
the charge to the applicant in a timely manner was enunciated inMohamed Abubakari, supra n 77 at paras
145, 161.
111 Association Pour le Progrès et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes, supra n 84 at paras 9, 95, 125, 135.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. at paras 9, 78, 115, 125, 135.
114 ECCJ,Essien vTheRepublic of TheGambia andAnotherApplicationNoECW/CCJ/APP/05/05, 14March
2007 at paras 1 and 11. A list of all judgments by the ECCJ is available at: www.courtecowas.org [last
accessed16March2019]. Someof theCourt’s judgments from2004 to2009arenot availableon theCourt’s
website. From2004 to 2009 they have beenpublished in anofficial reporter (2004-2009CommunityCourt
of Justice ECOWAS Law Report), but it is not widely available, including to the author. Selected decisions
are available on other online databases, including the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria,
African Human Rights Case Law Database. Unless indicated otherwise, all judgments cited herein are
available at the Court’s website.
115 ECCJ, Sikiru Alade v Nigeria 11 June 2012 (judgment unavailable to the author) as discussed in Ebo-
brah, ‘Human Rights Developments in African Sub-Regional Economic Communities during 2012’
(2013) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 178 at 203; ECCJ, The Registered Trustees of the Socio-
Economic Rigths and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The Federal Republic of Nigeria and Anor Application
No ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, 14 December 2012 at para 28.
116 ECCJ, Pawimondom v Togo Application No ECW/CCJ/JUD/02/17, 19 February 2018 at 3 (in French
only); ECCJ, Jerome Bougouma and Others v Burkina Faso Application No ECW/CCJ/JUD/15/17,
19 February 2018 at 3 (in French only); ECCJ, Nosa Ehanire Osaghae v Nigeria Application No ECW/
CCJ/JUD/20/15, 10 October 2017 at para 3.
117 ECCJ, Synecoci v Côte d’ Ivoire Application No ECW/CCJ/JUD/39/16, 19 February 2018 at 3 (in French
only);Nosa Ehanire Osaghae, ibid. at para 3.
118 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. See Pawimondom, supra n 116 at 3; ECCJ,Dorothy ChiomaNjemanze and 3 Others v
Nigeria Application No ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/17, 12 October 2017 at 2-3.
119 Dorothy Chioma Njemanze and 3 Others, ibid.; ECCJ, Mahamoudou and Others v Mali Application
No ECW/CCJ/JUD/39/15, 7 May 2016 at para 20 (in French only); ECCJ, Koraou v Niger Application
No ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/08, 27 October 2008 at para 28.
120 Supra n 115. See Ebobrah, ‘Dual Mandate, Carried Authority: The Skewed Authority of the ECOWAS
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recognizes only the jurisdiction of Nigerian courts over the ICCPR and, second, the
ICESCR is not justiciable. The ECCJ dismissed the objection by stating that
[B]y establishing the jurisdiction of the Court, [the Member States parties
to the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS] have created a mechanism for guaranteeing
and protecting human rights within the framework of ECOWAS so as to
implement the human rights contained in all the international instruments they
are signatory to.121
The prospect of UN human rights treaties being justiciable and enforceable by a
regional human rights court is a source of uneasiness, to say the least. Entrusting such
a task to a regional human rights court is ‘highly unusual’.122 Yet, the ACtHPR has
clear jurisdiction to apply and monitor UN human rights treaties (if ratified by the
State concerned). From a strictly legal point of view, the question of whether a given
African State has also consented to the individual communications procedure under a
UN human rights treaty is immaterial.123 The same can be said for the ECCJ, which
has also been subject to criticism for exercising its jurisdiction over UN treaties.124 The
ACtHPR’s jurisdiction rationemateriae deviates from the ‘prototype’ of the contentious
jurisdiction of international courts on human rights, which is typically limited to the
interpretation and application of a specific regional treaty. For this reason, the ACtHPR
does not sit well within the existing categories of adjudicative bodies125 and, conse-
quently, the relevanceof arguments concerningother international courts shouldnot be
taken for grantedwhenaddressing theACtHPR.The followingdiscussion engageswith
the question of whether concerns raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the ACtHPR
have certain merit or merely project anxieties from dissimilar contexts and, if yes, to
what extent.
(i) Towards an Arusha-based world court on human rights for African States?
One may argue that, as far as African States are concerned, the ACtHPR functions as
a world court on human rights based in Arusha.126 Ideas about consolidating human
rights monitoring mechanisms into a single judicial body—aWorld Court on Human
Rights—have been debated for decades.127 Clearly the design of the ACtHPR is not
what was expected by many, but it is an intriguing design in international judicial adju-
dication. It creates a mechanism which does not consolidate monitoring mechanisms
(as the envisagedWorld Court onHuman Rights does), but consolidates human rights
121 SERAP, supra n 115 at para 29.
122 Heyns, supra n 7 at 167.
123 Cf. Viljoen, supra n 7 at 437-8.
124 For example, Ebobrah, supra n 115 at 203.
125 Romano, supra n 16 at 245. See alsoRomano,Alter andShany, ‘Mapping InternationalAdjudicativeBodies,
the Issues and Players’ in Romano, Alter and Shany, supra n 12, 3 at 9-10.
126 Meron, supra n 98. On the recurring theme on the need, desirability and feasibility for a world court on
human rights, see Subedi, The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System: Reform and the Judicialisation
of Human Rights (2017) at 239-3; Kozma, Nowak and Scheinin, ‘A World Court of Human Rights:
Consolidated Draft Statute and Commentary’ (2010), available at: cadmus.eui.eu [last accessed 16March
2019]; Alston, ‘Against a World Court for Human Rights’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 197.
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obligations of State parties under the auspices of a single judicial body on a regional
level. The ACtHPR is ‘the judicial arm of the panoply of human rights agreements
concluded under the aegis of the United Nations’.128 Notably this model is expected
to be strengthened, since the future African Court of Justice and Human Rights is
entrusted129 not only with all legal disputes concerning the interpretation and the
application of the Charter and any other legal instruments relating to human rights
ratified by the States parties concerned, but also with legal disputes concerning any
question of international law.130 In this context, three main reasons may be discerned
for treating the broad jurisdiction of the ACtHPR as a problem, rather than a welcome
variance, in dispute settlement.
The first reason for being distrustful toward the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction lies in the
authority of a regional court to apply, declare violations of and monitor UN treaties.131
The function of an international court on a regional level or a given geographical area
casts doubt onto its relevance at a global level.132 An early and characteristic case in
point was the Central American Court of Justice. In 1944, Manley Hudson strongly
opposed the creation of a regional international court of general jurisdiction, because it
would allegedly give rise to ‘a particularistic development of international law’,133 and it
would risk the primacy and universality of general international law.134 This mindset is
also reflected in theway that scholars andpractitioners systematize international courts,
dividing them on the basis of their regional and universal jurisdiction, respectively.135
However, not everybody currently sees these developments in a negative light.136 As
128 Romano, supra n 5.
129 According to Article 9 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice andHuman Rights, the Protocol to the
ACHPR, and the Statute annexed to it, shall enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the instruments of
ratification by 15Member States. SixMember States have ratified thus far, see: www.african-court.org [last
accessed 16March 2019].
130 Article 28 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
131 Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v United
Republic of Tanzania, supra n 27 at Separate Opinion of Vice-President Fatsah Ouguergouz, para 16;
Mbondenyi, supra n 74 at 470.
132 Farrell, ‘Distribution’ in Schabas and Murphy (eds), Research Handbook on International Courts and
Tribunals (2017) 337 at 346.
133 Hudson, International Tribunals: Past and Future (1944) at 179.
134 Ibid. at 179.
135 For example, Tomuschat, ‘International Courts and Tribunals’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public Inter-
national Law (last updated February 2011); Janis (ed.), International Courts for the Twenty-First Century
(1992), Parts II and III; French, Saul and White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement: New
Problems and Techniques (2010), Part III; Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity
within Diversity (2011).
136 For example, Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law’ (2003) 52 International &
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will be discussed below, regional and specialized developments, as well as pronounce-
ments of all international courts, inform (general) international law.137 This strongly
suggests the need for a more nuanced approach regarding the value and relevance of
judgments and pronouncements by regional international courts.
A second reason for treating the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction as a problematic circum-
stance rests upon the prevailing view that specialized international courts create risks for
diverging interpretations of international law. For this reason, specialized international
courts should not extend their pronouncements beyond matters which ‘do not lie
within the specific purview of [their] jurisdiction’.138 In the context of the present
discussion, this entails that the ACtHPR should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
over other treaties on human rights.139 This line of thinking reflects the insistence on
underlining the alleged risks posed by international courts entrusted with interpreting,
applying and monitoring a specific treaty and/or subject area, because they ‘could lead
to the destruction of the very foundation of international law’.140 The main concern
is that different interpretations of similar or identical rules of international law can
undermine the integrity of general international law, and the overall consistency of
international law. This anxiety is all the more pronounced with respect to international
courts on human rights, which are typically regional and specialized in scope.141 Lex
regionis and lex specialis have been formulated and developed as conjoined twins, and
have defined the identity of (and role served by) human rights courts. Nonetheless, this
view disregards first that the concept of divergence is over-emphasized and, second,
that the distinction between courts of general jurisdiction and courts entrusted with
specialized and/or regional jurisdiction is elusive, if not artificial.142
As to the first point on over-emphasizing divergence, it regularly gets overlooked
that different interpretations and even divergences qualify as natural and welcome
consequences of the nature and function of international law. The starting point of
137 There is no well-established definition of the notion of general international law. According to the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC): see Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission Finalized, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) at para 493), general international law
includes customary international law, general principles of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c)
of the Statute of the ICJ, and principles of the legal process. General international law may arguably
include certain treaties (especially codification conventions) which are law-making in nature and well-
ratified on a global basis (such as theUN treaties discussed herein) without implying that all widely ratified
treaties are part of general international law. See alsoWood, ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea and General International Law’ (2007) 22 International Journal Marine & Coastal Law 351 at 354-5.
Cf. Tomuschat, ‘General International Law: A New Source of International Law?’ in Pisillo Mazzeschi and
De Sena (eds),Global Justice, Human Rights and the Modernisation of International Law (2018) 185.
138 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43 at para 403.
139 Ebobrah, supra n 115 at 203.
140 Oda, ‘The International Court of Justice from the Bench’ (1993) 244 Hague Recueil des Cours 9 at 145.
Cf. Caminos, ‘The Growth of Specialised International Tribunals and the Fears of Fragmentation of
International Law’ in Boschiero et al. (eds), supra n 91 at 55. See alsoGuillaume, supra n 93; and Schwebel,
supra n 96. Schwebel’s position is admittedly much more nuanced.
141 Romano, supra n 16 at 266; Schabas, ‘Introduction’ in Schabas andMurphy, supra n 132, 1 at 20.
142 Bodeau-Livinec and Giorgetti, ‘Developing International Law at the Bar: A Growing Competition among
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this discussion should be that two international courts disagreeing over the content
of rules of international law is a healthy phenomenon.143 In fact, given the nature of
international law, and in the absence of explicit regulation by States, ‘there can be as
many judicial interpretations as there are [international] courts’.144 Moreover, looking
for and highlighting a handful of instances of divergences and/or disagreements145
over-stresses the phenomenon and distorts the overall picture of communication and
coordination among international courts.146 It is also crucial howone appreciates diver-
gence. There is a thin line separating divergence from the development of international
law (or the potential to develop international law).147 The Loizidou andTadic´ cases are
the most well-cited examples of giving rise to wrong and impermissible divergences
to (general) international law.148 However, in retrospect, Loizidou149 is not treated
anymore as a divergence to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide
Convention,150 but as having paved the way for the enrichment of international law.151
The Tadic´ case is treated by many as hardly a drama,152 given the different relevant
contexts of the jurisdictions of and cases before the ICJ and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia respectively.
Returning to the second point on the implications of distinguishing between courts
of general jurisdiction and courts entrusted with specialized and/or regional jurisdic-
tion, there is a growing acceptance of the role and value of regional and/or specialized
courts and other bodies. The main frame of reference of this line of thinking is that
143 Schwebel, supra n 96 at 4.
144 Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudications: Getting Over the Amour Impossible
between International Law and Adjudication’ in Romano, Alter and Shany, supra n 12, 413 at 425.
145 Shany, supra n 101 at 20-30. See for discussion Brown, ‘Review Essay - The Proliferation of International
Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way through the Maze’ (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal International
Law 453.
146 Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative
Law Quarterly 791 at 797.
147 Oellers-Frahm, ‘Proliferation’ in Schabas andMurphy, supra n 132, 299 at 321.
148 For example, Guillaume, supra n 93 at 4-6; Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National and the
Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 6.
149 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections)ApplicationNo 15318/89, 23March 1995 [GrandChamber] at
paras 67-84.
150 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Reports 1951, 15.
151 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda)
(New Application: 2002) Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgment,
3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 6 at Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans,
Judge Elabary, Judge Owada and Judge Simma, para 23; Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International
Court of Justice’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 745 at 747; Thirlway, ‘The Proliferation of
International JudicialOrgans and the Formation of International Law’ inHeere (ed.), International Law and
the Hague’s 750th Anniversary (1999) 433 at 437-8. The ILCGuide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties
also affirm this: see Report of the ILC on theWork of its 63rd session, A/66/10/Add. 1, at Guideline 1.3.2,
Guideline 2.1.2 and accompanied commentary.
152 Prosecutor v Tadic´ IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 8 September
1995 at para 11.Cf.Case concerningMilitary andParamilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States of America)Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14 at para 222;Application of the Convention
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international courts have much to learn from each other153 and that each international
court, in one way or another, applies the law whose content has been influenced by
other international courts as well as other bodies.154 The ICJ, in a departure from
its long-standing practice, now openly acknowledges and appreciates the authority of
regional and special international courts.155 The ICJ affirmed their contribution to
ascertaining the formation and content of customary international law,156 to discerning
general principles157 and to interpreting international treaties. In 2010, within the
context of interpreting the ICCPR, the ICJ stated that ‘[a]lthough the Court is in no
way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of
the Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to
the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically
to supervise the application of that treaty’.158 The Court used the views of the CAT
Committee to interpret the CAT,159 the views of theHRC’s to interpret the ICCPR,160
and the views of the ACmHPR to interpret the ACHPR.161 Interestingly, in order to
confirm its construction of the ACHPR, the Court gave due regard to the case law of
both the ECtHR and IACtHR.162
The foregoing points demonstrate that the possibility of different interpretations
of UN and other treaties by the ACtHPR or the alleged risk to the coherence of
international (human rights) law163 should not be overemphasized. Such concerns can
bemitigated asmuch as possible bywayof interpretation and cross-judicial dialogue.164
153 Supra n 92 at Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para 238.
154 Schwebel, supra n 96 at 4; Cançado Trindade, ‘The Development of International Human Rights Law by
the Operation and the Case Law of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’ (2004)
25Human Rights Law Journal 157 at 158.
155 Simma, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Contribution of the International Court of Justice’ (2012)
3 Journal International Dispute Settlement 1 at 12-4.
156 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports
2012, 99, at paras 72, 73, 76, 78, 90. See the draft conclusions of the ILC on identification of customary
international law: see ILC, 70th Session, Identification of customary international law: Statement of the
Chair of the Drafting Committee, Mr Charles Chernor Jalloh, 25 May 2018, at Draft Conclusion 13, 14,
available at: legal.un.org [last accessed 16March 2019]. Conclusion 13 reads: ‘[D]ecisions of international
courts and tribunals, in particular of the ICJ, concerning the existence and content of rules of customary
international law are a subsidiarymeans for the determination of such rules’. The decisions’ value primarily
depends on the quality of reasoning and on how they were received by States and future case law.
157 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) Compensation, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 2012, 324 at paras 13, 18, 24, 33, 40, 56.
158 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, supra n 94 at para 66 (emphases added).
159 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2012, 422 at paras 100-2.
160 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, supra n 94 at para 67.
161 Ibid. at para 67.
162 Ibid. at paras 67-68; see also Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras 232, 237.
163 Ebobrah, supra n 115 at 203.
164 For detailed discussion on how theACtHPR interprets the ACHPRby taking other international rules into
account, seeRachovitsa, ‘TheAfricanCourt onHuman andPeoples’ Rights:AUniquelyEquippedTestbed
for (the Limits of) Human Rights Integration?’ in Bribosia and Rovine (eds), Human Rights Tectonics:
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In line with this, the ACtHPR gives refers extensively to the views of UN bodies165
and the jurisprudence of other human rights courts.166 The ECCJ also follows the
same approach.167 Interestingly, a characteristic example of the ACtHPR unjustifiably
refraining from addressing issues of general international law is its orders relating to
two separate requests for an advisory opinion on the same legal questions pertaining
to the case of Al Bashir.168 In particular, the questions asked by the authors of the
requests concerned the relationship of an African State’s obligations under the Rome
Statute (obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court) and as AU
Members (obligation to complywith anAUresolution calling fornon-cooperationof its
members with the International Criminal Court).169 The Court rejected the requests
because, among other reasons, ‘the issues raised by the authors are rather of general
public international law and not human rights. Indeed, the issues raised have to do with
the hierarchy of norms in public international law’.170 The Court’s dubious reasoning,
however, does not explain why these issues do not relate to a ‘legalmatter relating to the
Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments’ (Article 4(1) Protocol to the
ACHPR) thereby falling under its jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. What is all
the more important for the present discussion is the artificial and unsound distinction
that the Court drew between the so-called general international law and human rights
as if human rights is an area unrelated to international law.171 Judge Ouguergouz in
his dissenting opinion correctly highlighted that human rights, like any other matter
governed by international law, is likely to raise issues relating to the law of treaties,
including any issues of hierarchy of international norms.172 This (and the admittedly
highly politicized issues concerning President Al Bashir) is not a reason for theCourt to
refrain fromrendering an advisoryopinion should thequestions at hand relate indeed to
a legalmatter concerning theCharter (or any other relevant human rights instruments).
165 On theACtHPR taking into considerationofGeneralComments by theHRCand the ICESCRCommittee
as authoritative statements on the interpretation of the provisions of the respective UN treaties, see
Tanganyika Law Society, supra n 27 at para 107.4; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v
Republic of Kenya, supra n 80 at para 181.
166 On the ACtHPR giving due regard to the case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR, see Lohé Issa Konaté,
supra n 75 at paras 147-54, 158-63;Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others, supra n 77 at paras 136-54; Alex
Thomas, supra n 77 at paras 146-7;Tanganyika LawSociety, supra n 27 at para 82.1;Actions pour la Protection
des Droits de l’Homme, supra n 37 at para 95;Mohamed Abubakari, supra n 77 at paras 25-7.
167 Taking cognizanceof thepracticeof theHRC(for example, ECCJ,BensonOluaOkombavBeninApplication
NoECW/CCJ/APP/27/14, 10October 2017 at 24); the case lawof theECtHR(for example,BensonOlua
Okomba, ibid. at 10, 13, 15, 16-7 and 23; Dorothy Chioma Njemanze and 3 Others, supra n 118 at 34, 37;
ECCJ, The Incorporated Trustees of Fiscal and Civic Right Enlightenment Foundation v Nigeria Application
No ECW/CCJ/APP/02/14, 7 June 2016 at 44-6); or the case law of the IACtHR (for example, Benson
Olua Okomba, ibid. at 10-1, 23;Dorothy Chioma Njemanze and 3 Others, supra n 118 at 32, 39).
168 Infra n 56.
169 RequestNo 1/2014 for AdvisoryOpinion, supra n 56 at para 5;RequestNo 1/2015 for AdvisoryOpinion, supra
n 56 at para 5.
170 Request No 1/2015 for Advisory Opinion, supra n 56 at para 18. See also Request No 1/2014 for Advisory
Opinion, supra n 56 at para 13.
171 Request No 1/2015 for Advisory Opinion, supra n 56 at Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz,
paras 18-22. See also Viljoen, supra n 11 at 92-3.
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Finally, a third reason for being particularly reluctant to entertain the possibility
that a regional international court may monitor UN or other global treaties con-
cerns specifically the conceptual and geographical topos of the ACtHPR. The authority
of regional bodies to construe international law brings to the fore informal hierar-
chies among said international courts, and the structural imbalance entrenched in the
Euro-centredmapof the international law landscape.173 Thefixity of cities and spacesof
delivering international justice, and developing international law, is well reflected in the
very limited number and geographical worldwide scope of those cities in which these
processes take place.174 The ‘law of Geneva’ and the ‘law of TheHague’ assign interna-
tional law a location, and narrate a specific story of progress.175 This inhibits us from
giving due regard to the seemingly unlikely places in which international law may be
found.176 The ACtHPR can be seen as part of a different plausible map of international
law,177 supporting a plurality of loci for experimenting with, and articulating, variant
designs. As far as our perception is concerned, there is a geographical and conceptual
distance to bridge between envisaging Geneva as the seat of the proposedWorld Court
on Human Rights on the one hand,178 and accepting the possibility that Arusha is
the seat of the World Court on Human Rights for African States, on the other hand.
Bridging this gap challenges us to rethink human rights law and institutions.179 Murray
has perceptively highlighted that international human rights law and international
human rights scholars have focused primarily on European and Western sources and
neglected other jurisdictions. Western scholars give the impression that one has little
to learn from African institutions and their experiences, under the pretexts that the
ACtHPR is a young institution, ineffective or irrelevant.180 One should add to this that
it is not only Western scholars, but also African scholars, who do not seem to value
the unique features and potential of the ACtHPR; they focus, instead, on the alleged
risks posed by the diversion from the mainstream ‘model(s) of success’ of regional
human rights courts as well as, in general, the ‘templates’ of designing mechanisms of
international judicial dispute settlement.181
(ii) Introducing propriety considerations in exercising the African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ jurisdiction?
Interestingly, the ACtHPR may be developing a policy of judicial restraint when exer-
cising its jurisdiction over human rights treaties other than the ACHPR. The Court
proclaimed that it is not necessary to consider alleged violations of the ICCPR if it
has already ruled on similar alleged violations under the relevant provisions of the
173 Pearson, ‘Spaces of International Law’ (2008) 17Griffith Law Review 489 at 496.
174 Ibid. at 498.
175 Koller, ‘ . . .andNewYork andTheHague andTokyoandGeneva andNuremberg and . . .. TheGeographies
of International Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 97 at 98. See also how,more broadly,
the ordered categories of dispute settlement tell a powerful story in Romano, supra n 16 at 243.
176 Pearson, supra n 173 at 490.
177 Ibid. at 498.
178 Article 2 Draft Statute of theWorld Court on Human Rights.
179 Murray, supra n 18 at 197.
180 Ibid. at 193, 195.
181 Alter, Helfer andMcAllister, supra n 5 at 779, is a rare example of scholars who embrace the potential of the
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Charter.182 In this way, the Court seems to prioritize alleged violations under the
Charter, but no criteria are articulated on when it is unnecessary to examine those other
treaties. In other instances, the Court simply did not address the applicants’ claims
regarding alleged violations of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, without elaborating on
the reasons for not doing so.183 TheCourtmaintains an inconsistent practice regarding
the examination of similar or identical provisions given under different human rights
treaties. For example, in the cases of Lohé Issa Konaté and Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza,
the Court found that Article 19 of the ICCPR had been breached, whereas in Aboulaye
Nikiema and Others the Court deemed the examination of the alleged violation of
Article 19 of the ICCPR unnecessary.184 Another cluster of cases concerning the right
to free legal assistance under the right to a fair trial provide further evidence of the
discrepant case law. In its 2015 judgment in the Alex Thomas case, the ACtHPR found
that Tanzania had failed to comply with its obligations under both the Charter and the
ICCPR.185 The subsequentWilfred Onyango Nganyi case mentions a violation only of
the Charter.186 Finally, in the 2016Mohamed Abubakari judgment, the Court framed
the question before it as being one of whether the State was compliant with Article 7
of the Charter and Article 14 of the ICCPR, and proceeded to affirm that by failing to
provide free legal assistance, Tanzania was in violation of both Article 7 of the Charter
and Article 14 of the ICCPR.187 At the other end of the spectrum, in the recent APDF
and The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Mali judg-
ment, the Court decided solely on alleged violations of other treaties on human rights
without bringing theACHPR into play.188 It remains, therefore, to be seenwhether this
judgment signals a different approach of the Court or an exceptional circumstance.
It is notable that the ECCJ also appears to introduce certain caveats to the human
rights treaties that it is willing to discuss. In a more rigorously articulated justification
compared to the ACtHPR, the ECCJ, in SERAP, stated that when ‘various articles of
different instruments sanction the same rights, the said instruments may, as far as those
specific rights are concerned, be considered equivalent. It suffices therefore to cite the
onewhich affordsmore effective protection to the right allegedly violated’.189 The term
‘equivalent’ denotes norms which are identical or similar, but whose interpretation is
subject to the structure, aim, specificities and development of their normative con-
text.190 Contrary to the ACtHPR, which favours the application of the Charter over
other human rights provisions, the ECCJ prefers to apply the more favourable treaty.
182 Tanganyika Law Society, supra n 27 at para 123;AbdoulayeNikiema andOthers, supra n 26 at paras 115–118,
118, 157, 170, 188.
183 ACtHPR,AfricanCommission onHuman and Peoples’ Rights v LibyaApplicationNo002/2013, 3 June 2016
at para 77; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya, supra n 80 at para 2.
184 Lohé Issa Konaté, supra n 75 at para 176; Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza, supra n 75 at para 173(ix); Abdoulaye
Nikiema and Others, supra n 26 at para 188.
185 Alex Thomas, supra n 77 at para 124.
186 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others, supra n 77 at para 184.
187 Mohamed Abubakari, supra n 77 at paras 140, 145.
188 Association Pour le Progrès et la Défence des Droits des Femmes Maliennes, supra n 84 at paras 9, 78, 95, 115,
125, 135.
189 SERAP, supra n 115 at para 92 (emphasis added).
190 Broude and Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’ in Broude and
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The ECCJ’s tendency to focus on the more favourable provisionmay be due to the fact
that it doesnothave a constitutive catalogueof human rights, as theACtHPRdoes.That
said, since the 2012 SEPAP judgment, the ECCJ has given no indication that it actually
applies this statement in practice. In instances in which many treaties were applicable
to the facts of a case, the ECCJ found violations of a variety of human rights treaties
and instruments (for example, the Charter, the ICCPR, CEDAW or even the UDHR)
in a cumulative fashion, without choosing the more favourable and/or equivalent treaty
provision.
The inconsistent case law of both Courts does not allow for definite conclusions to
be drawn as to whether they actually apply the foregoing caveats to the exercise of their
jurisdiction over treaties on human rights. It is possible that the two Courts will create
judicial policies introducing propriety considerations, so as not to examine all relevant
human rights treaties. It is not uncommon for international courts to limit the scope
of a ruling without examining all submissions raised by the applicants or all possible
legal bases. Different legal justifications may be furnished to justify such a judicial
practice. First, international courts have the power to decide the scope of a claim, by
determining how the legal grounds establishing their jurisdiction and the nature of
the claims shape the subject of a dispute.191 A court has the power to ascertain its
competence to entertain a legal claimwhichmeans that, even though it has jurisdiction
to decide a complaint, it may deem it inappropriate to exercise said jurisdiction.192
Second, international courts may not address all submissions by the applicants or all
possible legal bases regarding the complaint(s) due to reasons of procedural economy,
or due to their reluctance to address a particular question,193 as long as a court’s
approach is not unduly reductive.194 Third, it is also possible for international courts
to make a choice of applicable law in cases in which many rules are applicable. This is
not necessarily an issue of lex specialis, but rather an issue of ‘locating the corpus of law
at the heart of a difficult issue’.195 An example is the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, in which the ICJ answered the question of the legality of nuclear
weapons not by reference to human rights law (right to life under the ICCPR) or
principles of environmental law, but by reference to jus in bello.196 This was not an
application of lex specialis, but a question of what norm and/or body of law is the
most relevant to the matter as it was submitted to and construed by the ICJ. In light of
the distinctive material jurisdiction of the ACtHPR extending over a variety of human
191 CertainQuestions ofMutualAssistance inCriminalMatters (Djibouti v France)Merits, Judgment, 4 June2008,
ICJ Reports 2008, 177 at paras 70-75; Kolb, The International Court of Justice (2013) at 188-90.
192 Although the ICJ usually considers the propriety of exercising its jurisdiction in its Advisory Opinions or
in cases of forum prorogatum, propriety considerations can be relevant in contentious proceedings too: see
Thirlway,The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (2013) at 1658-62.Certain Questions of
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra n 191 at paras 70-5.
193 Harris et al. (eds), Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn
(2018) at 803-4 (concerning Article 14 ECHR).
194 Sükran Aydin and Others v Turkey Applications Nos 49197/06 et al., Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 May
2013 at para 3.
195 Higgins, supra n 146 at 792.
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rights treaties, one could argue that the ACtHPRmay develop a practice of ‘calibrating’
the dispute and finding the heart of the matter brought before it.197
TheACtHPR can employ either the procedural economyor the choice of applicable
law avenues in order to legally justify, if it deems it necessary, a policy of exercising
judicial restraint. In this regard, there is merit in the argument that the ACtHPR
exercises its jurisdiction over other human rights treaties only when specific rights are
not contained, or are differently formulated, in the ACHPR.198 More generally, it is not
unreasonable either that the Court decides complaints brought before it by prioritizing
or choosing as a legal basis of a complaint a right that is provided for in AU treaties.
In this way, the Court will find resort to non-AU treaties only when they bring in new
rights199 and, at the same time, it will not lose sight of developing the standards of the
ACHPR and the African corpus juris. These suggestions also align with the equivalence
idea that the ECCJ put forward in the SEPAP judgment and the ACtHPR’s practice to
have the ACHPR in the foreground.
In sum, crafting judicial policies which introduce propriety considerations so that
theACtHPRdoes not examine all relevant human rights treaties presents risks. There is
the possibility of unduly reducing the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae.
Moreover, it is not an easy task to make and justify a choice of a human rights treaty,
against which an applicant’s complaint shall be assessed. If the ACtHPR proceeds with
adopting such a practice, it is strongly advisable that it elaborates on specific criteria as
to whether or not a complaint under a human rights treaty should be examined. This is
dictated by considerations of legal certainty and equal treatment of the applicants.
A few thoughts need to be devoted to the argument often raised that, if the Court
exercises its broad jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent, this will create a political
‘backlash’200 orwill deter States from ratifying theProtocol (or evenother human rights
treaties).201 These political implications are implicitly framed as an issue for theCourt’s
judicial policy and it is, therefore, fitting to address them in this sub-Section. At this
point in time, the practice of State parties to the ACHPR and the Protocol does not
support these arguments. No State acting as a respondent State before the Court has
ever challenged the Court’s construction of its material jurisdiction. If there were a
climate of dissatisfaction among States with regard to this matter, it is very likely that
they would have raised preliminary objections ratione materiae before the Court. It is
only in Tanganyika Law Society that Tanzania challenged the broad interpretation of
‘human rights treaty’ but not theCourt’s overall approach to itsmaterial jurisdiction.202
Furthermore, the fact that States parties submit requests for the interpretation of the
197 SERAP, supra n 115 at para 93.
198 Viljoen, ‘Regional Institutions and Remedial Arrangements for the Judicial Enforcement of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa’ in Chirwa and Chenwi (eds), The Protection of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016) 243 at 252.
199 Ibid. at 252-3.
200 For example, see discussion in Viljoen, supra n 7 at 438; and Viljoen, supra n 198 at 252-4.
201 For example, Heyns, supra n 7 at 167. Cf. Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 223 at 227-8, who argues that, conversely,
the wide scope of the Court’s jurisdiction may discourage States from using the ratification of the Protocol
(or other human rights treaties) as a public relations’ exercise thereby leading in the long term to better
compliance with the ACHPR.
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Court’s previous judgments suggests that States take the Court’s remedial orders seri-
ously.203 More importantly, reducing the issue of States’ consenting to and complying
with the Court’s mandate only to its wide jurisdiction ratione materiae downplays a
variety of significant factorswhichmay either deter States from acceding to theACHPR
and the Protocol or give rise to such a ‘backlash’. These factors include the broad
access to the Court (Article 5 Protocol to the ACHPR), compliance costs, ideological
trends, domestic legal traditions and regional and domestic dynamics.204 One needs
to bear in mind that the ACtHPR is called upon to function and develop its case law
in a historical context in which not only judicialization of international affairs is being
generally slowed down205 but also there is a general ‘backlash’ against international law
institutions.206 In light of the foregoing, the present author is of the view that solely
the possibility of a political ‘backlash’, which is an obviously extra-legal consideration,
should not interfere with the Court’s mandate and jurisdiction.
C. The Anxiety of Threatening AfricanHuman Rights Law
(i) Undermining the specificity of African human rights law
Heyns argues that the broad jurisdiction of the ACtHPR poses a risk to the specificity
of the ACHPR because the latter becomes but one treaty among others before the
ACtHPR.207 Although he does not clarify in what way this is a risk, it is likely he
means that the Court may be satisfied with finding violations of other treaties at the
expense of developing the Charter’s standards, and nurturing an African human rights
jurisprudence.208 This is a valid concern. The Court’s case law evidences that the
Charter is at the core of its legal reasoning, and it systematically discusses alleged
violations of the Charter hand in hand with other treaties, as shown in Section 3.2.
Nonetheless, this was not the case in the 2018 APDF judgment. In this instance, the
Court foundMali in breach of its obligations under CEDAW, theMaputo Protocol and
the African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child, without making any effort
203 ACtHPR, Interpretation of the Judgment of 3 June 2016—Mohamed Abubakari v United Republic of Tanzania
Application No 002/2107, 28 September 2017; ACtHPR, Interpretation of the Judgment of 18 November
2014—Actions pour la Protection desDroits de l’Homme vRepublic ofCote d’IvoireApplicationNo002/2107,
28 September 2017; ACtHPR, Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 2015—Alex Thomas v United
Republic of Tanzania Application No 001/2107, 28 September 2017.
204 Zschirnt, supra n 11; Alter, Gathii and Helfer, supra n 11.
205 Romano, supra n 16 at 274-5.
206 Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ (2018) 81 Modern Law
Review 1. For example, the instance in which the ACmHPR recently stripped the Coalition of African
Lesbians of its observer status (following decisions by the African Union Executive Council that
called on the Commission to consider ‘historical tradition and the values of African civilization’)
when reviewing applications for observer status needs to be appreciated in light of specificities of
the African region as well as general developments in international affairs: see Executive Council
African Union, Decision EX.CL/Dec.1015(XXXIII) (33rd Ordinary Session, 28-29 June 2018, Nouak-
chott, Mauritania) at paras 5, 6(i), 8(iv) and (vii); International Justice Resource Center, African
Commission Bows to Political Pressure, Withdraws NGO’s Observer Status, 28 August 2018, available
at: ijrcenter.org/2018/08/28/achpr-strips-the-coalition-of-african-lesbians-of-its-observer-status/ [last
accessed 16March 2019].
207 Heyns, supra n 7 at 167.
208 Viljoen and Baimu, ‘Courts for Africa: Considering the Co-Existence of the African Court on Human and
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propio motu to identify relevant provisions of the Charter or to link the Charter with
the facts of the case and the applicant’s submissions. The Court perhaps preferred to
focus on specialized treaties regarding women’s and children’s rights, but still the Court
should have furnished a link with States’ obligations under the Charter too. It should
be noted that, on this occasion, most of the treaties that the Court discussed (besides
CEDAW) are African treaties and, hence, the Court was still developing the African
corpus juris.
Creating a ‘variable geometry’ of State parties’ obligations is another point raised
regarding the undermining of African human rights by the Court’s broad jurisdiction.
According to this argument, if the obligations of State parties differ depending on what
other human rights treaties a given respondent State has ratified,209 this may result in
a ‘variable geometry’ of obligations of African States under the Charter and, therefore,
inhibit the construction of an African human rights corpus juris. This is not a significant
problem (or even a problem in the first place), given that international law in its essence
consists of many different variable geometries of international obligations. It is possible
for the Court to develop the corpus juris of African human rights while considering
and monitoring the implementation of specific treaties, with regard to the specific
respondent State(s) in each case.
The risk of undermining the specificity of African human rights law is more likely
to materialize not as a result of the ACtHPR’s broad jurisdiction, but in the context of
the interpretation process.210 The ACtHPR’s systematic reliance on the case law of the
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights may, in certain instances, raise
the question of whether such influence can be disproportionate. Conceptualizing the
development of the ACHPR within the context of international human rights law is a
challenging task for a young international court. On the one hand, it is expected of the
ACtHPR to take into consideration, and benefit from, the long-standing jurisprudence
of other regional human rights courts or the views of UN bodies. Articles 60 and
61 of the ACHPR contain concrete guidelines in this regard.211 On the other hand,
coordination and convergencewith global and other regional standards should not lead
to neglecting the development of a regional (African) human rights’ understanding, the
contours of which have already been established by the ACmHPR.212 This specificity
is rooted in the unique characteristics of human rights in the design of the ACHPR,
including the equal weight accorded to civil and political rights, economic, social and
cultural rights and also peoples’ rights, as well as the local (legal) reality in State parties
to the ACHPR. Such particularity gives rise to, and justifies, different interpretations
of specific human rights (compared to how the same or identical rights are interpreted
209 Heyns, supra n 7 at 167. See alsoMujuzi, supra n 10 at 193.
210 Rachovitsa, supra n 164.
211 Article 60 states: ‘The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the
Charter of the UnitedNations, the Charter of theOrganization of AfricanUnity, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field
of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members’.
212 Perrin, ‘African Jurisprudence for Africa’s Problems:HumanRightsNormDiffusion andNormGeneration
Through Africa’s Regional International Court’ (2015) 109 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American
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under other treaties).213 It is also pertinent to draw a distinction between AU treaties
and non-AUhuman rights treaties. AU treaties (for example, the AfricanCharter on the
Rights andWelfare of the Child, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the ECOWASDemoc-
racy Protocol) and especially when these AU treaties are protocols to the ACHPR
(for example, the Maputo Protocol) should have a privileged position vis-à-vis non-
AU treaties in the Court’s reasoning with a view to nurturing the Charter in its ‘native’
environment and to pursue the African corpus juris.
The ways in which the ACtHPR selects and uses relevant international instru-
ments and views of other (non-AU) monitoring bodies and international courts when
construing the Charter are crucial. A few concrete examples are called for. When
the ACtHPR is in the process of discerning the ordinary meaning of a provision in
the ACHPR its starting point and primary focus should be the text of the ACHPR,
without resorting prematurely to the case law of the ECtHR regarding the interpre-
tation of an equivalent right under the ECHR. This is what happened in Wilfred
Onyango Nganyi, when the ACtHPR, in establishing the meaning of ‘trial within a
reasonable time’ under Article 7(1)(d) of the ACHPR, had recourse to the criteria
of reasonableness developed throughout the extensive case law of the ECtHR.214
Moreover, the ACtHPR should engage in its reasoning with both the global and other
regional standards in a balanced and consistent manner—especially if the respondent
State is bound by said global standard(s).215 Otherwise, the ACtHPR runs the risk of
‘Europeanizing’ or ‘Inter-Americanizing’ its jurisprudence,216 in the sense of overem-
phasizing the relevance and influence of other regional human rights treaties. The
criteria set out by the jurisprudence of other international courts need to be tailored
and applied in light of local circumstances and legal reality in African countries. In
Mohamed Abubakari, the fact that the judgment was not delivered publicly should
have arguably been given more weight in the assessment of the alleged violation of
the right to a fair trial under the ACHPR since, unlike in Europe, it is not common
practice in many African States to have immediate access to the text of the judg-
ment.217 Moreover, the ACHPR in the APDF judgment case should have brought into
play the ACHPR and, more specifically, it should have engaged with the question of
whether and, if yes, how the duties of individuals toward the community (Articles 27
and 29 ACHPR) could have a legal relevance to the interpretation of women’s and
children’s rights.
Another example of the potentially problematic use of other, especially non-AU,
international instruments and views of other bodies when interpreting the Charter is
the ways in which the ACtHPR addresses peoples’ rights under the ACHPR, since
‘contrary to other human rights instruments, the ACHPR establishes the link between
the right to life and the inviolable nature and integrity of the human being’,218 and
213 Brems,Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) at 116-7, 126-8, 133-6.
214 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others, supra n 77 at paras 136-154; Mujuzi, supra n 10 at 218.
215 This was underlined in the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President, Justice Thompson inMohamed
Abubakari, supra n 77 at paras 9–10 and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafâa Ben Achour, ibid. at paras
15-17.
216 Mujuzi, supra n 10 at 218-9.
217 Ibid.
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violationsof economic, social andcultural rightsmayengender conditionsunfavourable
to a decent life. In the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic
of Kenya case, the Ogiek people claimed that limited access to and removal from
their ancestral home amounted to a violation of the community’s right to decent
survival, under Article 4 of the ACHPR. Even though the ACtHPR recognized the
Ogiek as an indigenous population, and it held that the expulsion of the Ogiek from
their ancestral lands against their will and without prior consultation violated their
communal ownership rights under the right to property, it left unclear whether this
violation was pronounced with regard to the individual members of the Ogiek or the
Ogiek as a people.219 In that judgment, the ACtHPR took cognizance of the practice
of the ACmHPR, the views and General Comment of the ICESCR Committee and
the case law of the IACtHR. This leaves one but to wonder to what extent the practice
of these bodies is of sufficient relevance to the ACHPR’s broader and more promising
provisions, which are not to be found in other human rights treaties.220
(ii) Fragmenting African human rights law
Whereas the previous analysis addressed how the ACtHPR may raise legal concerns
regarding its engagement with other human rights treaties, the present sub-Sections
focuses on the alleged risk of undermining the Charter due to differing interpretations
of theCharter by theACtHPRand theECCJ.This brings to the foreground the regional
vis-à-vis the sub-regional levels of analysis.
In the absence of a catalogue of human rights in the ECOWAS Revised Treaty,
the ECCJ decides human rights complaints by adopting the Charter as its standard of
assessment.221 It maintains that the Charter instantiates the ‘African regional human
rights framework’.222 The ECCJ’s interpretation, application and monitoring of the
Charter is seen by some as leading to possibly diverging interpretations or conflicting
judgments, and hence fragmentation of African human rights law.223 Moreover, the
ACtHPRand theECCJcould, in theory, imposedifferentobligationsuponStateswhich
219 The ACtHPR reserved its judgment on reparations, which is currently pending: seeAfrican Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya, supra n 80 at paras 128-131, 223. Cf. African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and
Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria Application No 155/1996, 27 October 2001 at paras 60-67, in which the
ACmHPR acknowledged that theOgoni peoples’ right to property, right to housing and right to a dignified
life were violated as collective human rights.
220 Cf. Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname IACtHR Series C 309 (2015) at paras 107-114; see
also Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez, para 9.
221 According to Article 19(1) Protocol (A/P.1/7/91 on the Economic Community Court of Justice, 6 July
1991) theECCJ ‘shall apply theTreaty, theRules of Procedure and, as necessary, Article 38 ICJ Statute’. The
ECCJ established its jurisdiction over the ACHPR by reference to Article 4(g) of the 1993 Revised Treaty
of ECOWAS, which reads: ‘[T]he High Contracting Parties, in pursuit of the objectives stated in Article 3
of the Treaty solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: . . .(g) recognition,
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.
222 ECCJ, Omar Jallow v Gambia Application No ECW/CCJ/APP/33/16, 10 October 2017 at 10. See also
ECCJ,Ugokwe v The Federal Republic of Nigeria Application No ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05, 7 October 2005
at para 29.
223 For example, Ebobrah, ‘Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Justice’
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have accepted the ACtHPR’s competence to receive individual complaints and are also
ECOWAS Member States.224 Finally, this could also mean that the same matter may
be submitted consecutively before both courts. The ACHPR, however, does not have
a provision precluding this scenario, and the Statute of the ECCJ prohibits only the
concurrent submission of an application concerning the same matter before another
international court.225
It is striking how this discussion transplants the arguments and anxieties from the
context of general bodies/global courts vis-à-vis regional/specialised courts into the
context of regional vis-à-vis sub-regional courts onhuman rights. First, it is assumed that
any tensions and different approaches in the case law of the ACtHPR and the ECCJ
are negative, even though as previously discussed, such differences can be productive
and meaningful and, in any event, not detrimental. Another recurring theme revolves
around the protection of the integrity of the global and regional standards which are
allegedly threatened by the regional/specialized and sub-regional courts, respectively.
One cannot fail to notice the irony of scholars who argue that the inclusion of other
(non-African treaties) into the jurisdiction of the ACtHPR undermines the specificity
of African human rights law (as discussed in the previous sub-Section) and, at the same
time, dismiss the opportunity to have two African courts enhancing the specificity of
the regional bill of rights. The dominant perception in international law is that other
bodies should not engage with, construe or monitor other treaties; and that the global
or regional courts and standards are challenged or undermined by the regional and sub-
regional courts and standards, respectively.226 Our frame of reference should not be
that a court holds a monopoly over its constitutive treaty. Neither the ACHPR nor the
Protocol establishing the ACtHPR confer exclusive jurisdiction on the ACtHPR.227
Our startingpoint shouldbe, instead, that international courts have a ‘sharedownership’
over the regional bill of rights and pursue a common endeavour.228
Crucially, there is nothing in the case law of the two courts to substantiate the
concern about lowering the standards of the regional bill of rights.229 On the contrary,
they seem to share a vision of exercising a ‘shared ownership’ over the regional bill
of rights which sets the minimum standard. The use and application of the Charter
by the ECCJ strengthens the clarity of international law and deepens human rights
protection.230 In general, the overlap between the UN covenants and regional and
224 Four out of the seven ECOWAS Member States are also subject to the ACtHRP’s jurisdiction: Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana andMali.
225 Article 10(d) of Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 amending Protocol A/P.1/7/91 relating to the
Economic Community Court of Justice, 19 January 2005. Cf. Article 6(2) Protocol to the ACHPR and
Article 56(7) ACHPR. See discussion inMurungi and Gallinetti, supra n 97 at 126.
226 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 496, suggests that the ‘sub-regional courts follow the African Court’s interpretation,
when such an interpretation exists, or byworking a systemof referral to the AfricanCourt for interpretative
guidance’. Murungi and Gallinetti, ibid. at 135, argue that the ACHPR is in a hierarchical position vis-à-vis
sub-regional human rights instruments and, hence, the use of theACHPRby the ECCJ blurs the normative
hierarchy.
227 Ebobrah, supra n 120 at 11. See, in general, Besson, supra n 144 at 425.
228 Helfer, supra n 78 at 349-53.
229 Murungi and Gallinetti, supra n 97 at 130.
230 Alter, Helfer and McAllister, supra n 5 at 778; Ebobrah, ‘Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional
Courts in Africa: Prospects and Challenges’ (2009) 17 African Journal of International & Comparative
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sub-regional human rights law, and their respective monitoring bodies, enhances the
influence of theUNcovenants in the domestic sphere ofAfrican States and consolidates
human rights standards.231 The courts’ systematic engagement with UN treaties, the
references to and use of the practice of the HRC and the case law of other regional
courts on human rights point toward this direction.232 In addition to this, important
and interesting issues (some of which have not found their way before the ACtHPR
yet) are being litigated before the ECCJ,233 since the EECJ enjoys a broad jurisdiction
and grants direct access for individuals without a requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies.234 The subject matter of cases heard by the ECCJ spans across slavery;
electoral systems and the right to political participation; independence of the judiciary;
gender-based discrimination with regard to inheritance rules; reparation for terrorism
victims; procedural aspects of the right to life; effective remedies; self-determination;
and natural resources.
As long as the ECCJ gives due regard to the pronouncements of the ACtHPR and
theACmHPR, any tensions or differing interpretations shall bemitigated appropriately.
This, of course, goes both ways—the ACtHPR also needs to take the ECCJ’s
judgments into accountwith regard to theECCJ’s pronouncements onboth theCharter
and other regional and sub-regional treaties and instruments on human rights which
form the African corpus juris. The continental ACtHPR regularly applies and declares
violations of regional treaties, such as the African Charter on Democracy,235 and
sub-regional treaties, including the ECOWAS Revised Treaty,236 the ECOWAS
Democracy Protocol237 and the Maputo Protocol.238 The absence of any discussion
on why it is only a sub-regional but not a regional court on human rights that may
undermine the African corpus juris reinforces the argument that unfounded, informal
hierarchies among international courts are very well entrenched in the way we survey
the legal horizon.
4. CONCLUSION
The ACtHPR’s distinctive jurisdiction to interpret, apply and monitor not only the
ACHPR but also other human rights treaties gives rise to a unique institutional design
in judicial adjudication. It is expected that the subject matter of the complaints brought
before the Court will further diversify in the future, and that the Court will have more
opportunities to clarify the scope of its jurisdiction, aswell as to nurture the specificities
of the ACHPR and the African corpus juris.
231 Besson, ‘The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regions: Lessons for the Role of
Comparative Law and of Regions in International Human Rights Law’ in Moeckli and Keller (eds), The
Human Rights Covenants at 50: Their Past, Present, and Future (2018) 243 at 261-2, 269-73.
232 See infra nn 164-167 and accompanying text.
233 Alter, Helfer andMcAllister, supra n 5 at 738.
234 Cf. Article 10(d) Supplementary Protocol A/S P.1/01/05 amending Protocol A/P.1/7/91 relating to
the Economic Community Court of Justice, 19 January 2005 with Article 6(2) Protocol to ACHPR in
conjunction with Article 56(5) and (6) ACHPR and Rules 34 and 40, Internal Rules of the ACtHPR,
supra n 70.
235 Actions pour la protection des droits de l’homme, supra n 39.
236 Lohé Issa Konaté, supra n 75 at para 12; Abdoulaye Nikiema and Others, supra n 26.
237 Actions pour la protection des droits de l’homme, supra n 39; Jerome Bougouma and Others, supra n 116 at 3.
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The present author does not find it, in principle, problematic that the UN and
other treaties may be justiciable and enforceable by a regional and specialized court
on human rights, since the ACtHPR has specifically been endowed with the authority
to do so. More generally, international courts should have as their frame of reference
a vision of ‘shared ownership’ over international law. The analysis in this article has
demonstrated that many international courts, including the ICJ, are gradually adopting
this framework. The possibility of divergent interpretations of similar or identical rules
of international law is largely overstressed in legal scholarship. Moreover, differences in
courts’ approaches also need to be appreciated as being productive andmeaningful and,
in any event, not that detrimental.
Although many of the concerns expressed by international law scholars regarding
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction are generally overemphasised, the Court’s juris-
diction is not without issues to address. The analysis highlighted certain difficulties
regarding the concept of ‘human rights treaty’ as a prerequisite for the Court to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. The introduction of propriety considerations to the ACtHPR’s
jurisdiction is a work in progress in the Court’s case law. It cannot be ruled out that
the Court will adopt a judicial policy of self-restraint with regard to (not) examining
specific complaints under other human rights treaties. Should the Court proceed with
adopting such a judicial policy, it is strongly advisable that it clarifies concrete criteria
and it does not reduce unduly the scope of its clear mandate. Finally, the development
of the ACHPR’s standards and the construction of a regional human rights corpus
juris have nothing to fear from the wide jurisdiction of the ACtHPR. Finally, the
developmentof theACHPR’s standards and the constructionof a regional human rights
corpus juris have nothing to fear from the wide jurisdiction of the ACtHPR as long
as the Court is cautious as to the relevance and weight it attaches to other treaties,
and the jurisprudence of other international courts and bodies when interpreting the
Charter. A critical factor that will determine the Court’s role, the development of a
sustainable jurisprudence, compliance on behalf of the respondent States and a possible
increase of the number of States accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, is the quality of its
judgments.239 This includes the clarity of its reasoning and the comprehensiveness of
the grounds of its decisions. The Court needs to address all points raised by the parties
to a case in a satisfactory manner, and to properly deal with issues pertaining to its
jurisdiction.240
239 For the ECtHR, seeMerrills,The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights,
2nd edn (1993) at 21. For the ICJ, seeLauterpacht,TheDevelopment of International Lawby the International
Court (1958) at 37-44; and Damrosch, ‘Article 56’ in Zimmermann, Tomuschat and Oellers-Frahm (eds),
The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd edn (2012) 1366 at 1374-5.
240 Murray, ‘A Comparison between the African and European Courts of Human Rights’ (2002) 2 African
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